
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a new adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing toolkit called NovaCookies that’s used as a proxy to redirect Microsoft 365 sign-ins, while capturing authenticated sessions in the process.
In a report shared with The Hacker News ahead of publication, Island characterized the $320/month service as a subscription-based phishing platform that facilitates real-time Microsoft 365 session theft. The kit has been used to target hundreds of organizations across multiple sectors in the U.S., the U.K., Canada, Germany, Israel, and the U.A.E. to date.
“Observed campaigns used genuine Docusign envelopes to carry counterfeit document-share lures, with some clicks routed through legitimate Microsoft or Google sign-in endpoints as redirect hops before reaching the kit,” Island said. “The message, document service and redirect can therefore appear trustworthy until the browser reaches attacker-controlled infrastructure.”
Like other AitM phishing kits, NovaCookies is designed to relay Microsoft 365 authentication through attacker-controlled infrastructure, allowing it to act as a proxy and harvest the resulting session after victims enter their passwords and multi-factor authentication (MFA) codes.
Evidence indicates that NovaCookies is advertised via Telegram, with the messaging service also used as infrastructure to manage customer profiles, configure redirect services, and contact support. According to Proofpoint, NovaCookies is assessed to be a variant of the Sneaky 2FA phishing kit.
“While the original Sneaky2FA appeared to focus mainly on Microsoft accounts, the NovaCookies variant includes dedicated flows for other identity providers, including Okta, and Entra domains federated to GoDaddy,” Proofpoint noted in an X post last month.
“Unlike Sneaky2FA, NovaCookies uses a fully managed phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) model where affiliates pay to use a PhaaS platform, and the infrastructure is hosted centrally by the PhaaS operator rather than by each affiliate.”
Many NovaCookies lure domains have been found to be hosted on the “.vu” domain (e.g., “fordmotbvmorcompany[.]vu”), with the phishing URLs featuring alternating-case labels such as PwPt-sHaRe, Ms36-AcCeSs, and ClOd-ViEw in an attempt to masquerade as legitimate Microsoft services.
One of the attack chains employs Docusign notifications as decoys to lead victims to the phishing pages, while bypassing sender-authentication and reputation checks by taking advantage of the fact that the email is a genuine Docusign notification. What’s malicious is the document shared via the service.
“Styled as a Docusign share notice, it claimed that an accounting department had shared a remittance-advice PDF and invited the recipient to open it,” Island said. “The malicious destination sat inside the document, below the layer most mail security products inspect.”
The attack then employs an OAuth error-redirect technique detailed by Microsoft earlier this March to lead victims to attacker-controlled infrastructure. The phishing infrastructure operated by NovaCookies is a live AitM relay designed to capture credentials and session information, and relay it to Microsoft in real time.
The commercial offering also boasts of various anti-analysis checks to evade security scanners before serving the bogus login form impersonating Microsoft 365. This includes a Cloudflare gate and a mechanism to detect execution passes associated with debugging tools.
“NovaCookies is built so each hop can look legitimate on its own: a trusted delivery service, an identity-provider redirect, then a familiar sign-in page,” Island said. “Those pieces often land in different tools. The browser is where they become a single event.”
The disclosure comes as PhaaS toolkits continue to be a lucrative subscription service in the cybercrime underground, allowing cybercriminals with little to no technical expertise to mount phishing campaigns at scale. Some of the new services that have emerged in recent months include –
The findings also come as a threat actor tracked as DOUBLOON DREDGER has been observed abusing Notion accounts to invite targets to view a PDF that contains a malicious link, clicking which takes them to an EvilTokens device code harvesting page.
“They abuse Notion to gain access to a legitimate email sender, reputable infrastructure, and a place to host a malicious PDF,” Sublime said. “They use a PDF builder that includes two to three overlapping links, attempting to evade defensive tooling and detections while potentially increasing the shelf life of any single malicious PDF with redundant infrastructure.”
“The payload landing page uses a JavaScript obfuscation and encryption technique similar to recent Tycoon 2FA device code harvesting campaigns.”
It’s suspected with low confidence that DOUBLOON DREDGER has acquired access to both EvilTokens and Tycoon 2FA and then uses their own custom first-stage JavaScript in front of the PhaaS kits. The threat actor is believed to be financially motivated.
“EvilTokens represents a structural shift in the PhaaS market. Previous platforms commoditized the front end of the attack: the lure, the landing page, the credential capture,” Flare security researcher Assaf Morag said. “EvilTokens commoditizes what comes after.”
“By automating inbox analysis, stakeholder mapping, and AI-generated fraud messages, it removes the skill barrier that once separated a captured token from a successful financial compromise. An affiliate no longer needs to understand business email compromise tradecraft, as the platform provides it as a feature.”
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